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[An] objection to this scheme is that two languages are to be used. One-half of
the members will get up and jabber in French, and not one of our members will
understand what they are saying. The courts of law are conducted in French too. In
Lower Canada one lawyer talks to the jury in French and another in English. This is
a system with which we want nothing to do.
	William Needham, 3 April 1866, House of Assembly of New Brunswick,
St John.1
MULTILINGUALISM POSES MANY CHALLENGES to national and supra-national

political and legal institutions, whether it comes from possible misunderstandings,
settling on the authoritative version of a text or the organization of work.
Even in the face of the emergence of English as a lingua franca, national and
sub-national languages will continue, in all likelihood, to play an important
role in the functioning of political and legal institutions. The situation in
Canada provides a rich fodder to start thinking about the specific challenges of
institutional multilingualism because, as the opening quotation reminds us, the
country has dealt with the question of institutional bilingualism since its very
beginnings. The respective place of French and English in public institutions—
from parliamentary debates to legal texts, from public education to judicial
proceedings—has been a periodic matter of contention.2 Notwithstanding this
situation, Canadian scholarship has surprisingly little to offer in terms of positive
1.
2.

Janet Ajzenstat et al, eds, Canada’s Founding Debates (Toronto: Stoddart
Publishing, 1999) at 329.
For a brief history, see André Braën, “Language Rights” in Michel Bastarache, ed, Language
Rights in Canada (Montréal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1987) at 3.
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evidence regarding the impact of unilingualism and bilingualism on public
institutions and, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence regarding
its impact on judicial behaviour.3
This lack of comprehensive empirical evidence about the behavioural impact
of institutional multilingualism is not distinctly Canadian; it is a feature of the
judicial politics and comparative constitutional studies in general.4 It seems
that the question of the interaction of law and languages has garnered more
interest from sociolinguists and anthropologists than legal scholars.5 To be fair,
the specific issue of judicial bilingualism might not be as politically salient in
other multilingual jurisdiction as it is in Canada; the institutional design of
the Supreme Court of Canada is perhaps unique in providing both for official
institutional bilingualism while also allowing some cases to be heard by judges
who do not understand the official language of the parties.
In Belgium, for example, each chamber of the Cour de Cassation is subdivided
into French and Flemish sections of five judges each and the cases are argued in

3.

4.
5.

There have been numerous normative debates on language rights and institutional
multilingualism both in Canada and elsewhere. See e.g. Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds,
Language Rights and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Philip
Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011); David Robichaud, “Cooperative justice and English as a lingua franca: the tension
between optimism and Anglophones free riding” (2015) 18 Crit Rev Intl Soc & Pol Phil
164. From a constitutional design perspective, see Sujit Choudhry, “Managing linguistic
nationalism through constitutional design: Lessons from South Asia” (2009) 7 Intl J Constl L
577. See also the special issue of the King’s Law Journal dedicated to this topic. Special Issue:
Translinguistic Law: Law and Language in Transnational Spaces (2014) 25 King’s LJ 137.
Sujit Chouhdry complains that “despite their salience, these issues have attracted relatively
minimal attention in the literature on both comparative constitutional law and constitutional
design.” See Choudhry, supra note 3 at 578.
There is considerable empirical and ethnographic literature on multilingualism in the
courtroom, especially in the United States. See e.g. Diana Eades, “Participation of Second
Language and Second Dialect Speakers in the Legal System” (2003) 23 Annual Review of
Applied Linguistics 113; John B Haviland, “Ideologies of Language: Some Reflections on
Language and U.S. Law” (2003) 105 Am Anthropologist 764; Philipp Sebastian Angermeyer,
“Creating Monolingualism in the Multilingual Courtroom” (2008) 2 Sociolinguistics Studies
385; Amy H Liu & Vanessa A Baird, “Linguistic Recognition as a Source of Confidence in
the Justice System” (2012) 45 Comp Pol Stud 1203. For a good overview of the field, see
generally Alan Durant & Janny HC Leung, Language and Law (London: Routledge, 2016).
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has never been any empirical analysis of the
impact of the linguistic proficiency of judges on judicial behaviour in an institutionally
multilingual setting.
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the language used by the lower courts.6 In Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal is
composed of 38 judges and the nomination process takes into consideration,
among other things, linguistic proficiency in the three official languages
(German, French, and Italian).7 Since the Tribunal sits in panels of three or,
in more important cases, panels of five judges, all cases can be heard by a panel
fluent in the language of the parties8. In India, even though English and Hindi
are official languages, article 348 of the Constitution provides that English is the
language of the National High Court.9 Likewise, in Kenya, even though English
and Keswahili are official languages,10 the rules of proceedings of the Supreme
Court of Kenya provide that English is the only language of the Court.11
Janny Leung suggests that approximately one quarter of the jurisdictions
worldwide are multilingual.12 An in-depth comparative analysis is thus far
beyond the scope of this article. However, the institutional design of the Supreme
Court of Canada that recognizes institutional bilingualism without imposing any
specific linguistic requirement for its sitting judges raises special concerns about
the impact of unilingualism on judicial behaviour.
Despite its prominent resurgence in the last ten years or so, the question of
the place given to French and English at the Supreme Court of Canada is not
new. Section 133 of the British North America Act, 1867 provides that French
and English “may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or
issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from
all or any of the Courts of Quebec.”13 Despite this provision, early in its history,
proceedings in French before the Supreme Court of Canada paled in comparison
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where Law Lords were more
acquainted with French law and French language more generally. The Supreme
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Loi du 15 juin 1935 concernant l’emploi des langues en matière judiciaire, art 27, online:
<www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/belgiqueetat-loi1935.htm>.
Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, Le Tribunal Fédéral Suisse: Le troisième pouvoir de l’état fédéral,
(Lausanne: Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, 2016), online: <www.bger.ch/files/live/sites/bger/files/
pdf/fr/bg_broschuere_a4.pdf>.
See Loi fédérale sur les langues nationales et la compréhension entre les communautés
linguistiques, art 6.
The Constitution of India (1950), art 348.
The Constitution of Kenya (2010), art 7(2).
Kenya, Supreme Court Rules (2012), art 6, online: <www.kenyalaw.org/lex//sublegview.
xql?subleg=No.%207%20of%202011>.
Janny HC Leung, “Negotiating language status in multilingual jurisdictions: Rhetoric and
reality” (2016) 209 Semiotica 371.
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 133, reprinted in RSC 1985,
Appendix II, No 5.
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Court of Canada’s unilingualism thus became a recurrent grievance of Quebec
politicians and lawyers in the first decades of the existence of the Court.14 Even
once it became the final appellate authority in the Canadian legal system in 1949,
the Supreme Court of Canada remained largely a unilingual institution. When
the number of seats reserved for members of the Quebec bar and bench increased
from two to three in 1949, Prime Minister Louis Saint-Laurent recognized that
“[t]he Quebec Bar [was] the only [bar] from which it [could] be expected that
French speaking lawyers [would] ever be appointed to the Supreme Court.”15
It was only in the 1960s that the Court came under the scrutiny of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the “Commission”). As part of
the Commission, in 1969 Peter H Russell published the first, and to date the
only, thorough study on the place given to French and English in the work of the
Court. In his report, Russell lamented the fact that “by any reasonable measure
of bilingualism, the Court has failed.”16 But Russell came short of recommending
that all judges should be bilingual even though he stressed that
[i]f the services of such a national tribunal are to be shared on an equal basis by
both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, changes must be made in
either the Supreme Court’s personnel or its method of conducting its business or
both which will make it as convenient for French-speaking Canadians to use their
native language in the Court as it is for English-speaking Canadians to plead their
cases in English.17

Things changed only incrementally with the adoption of the first Official
Languages Act in 196918 and, more importantly, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms in 1982.19 The former established French and English as the official
languages of Canada and gave individuals the right to give evidence in the
language of their choosing in any proceedings in criminal matters and before
any court created by an act of Parliament.20 The Supreme Court of Canada also
installed a system of simultaneous translation for the unilingual judges and the
14. Peter H Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 21.
15. See e.g. James G Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the
Institution (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1985) at 198.
16. Russell, supra note 14 at 213.
17. Ibid at 215.
18. An Act Respecting the Status of Official Languages in Canada, 17-19 Eliz II c 54 [Official
Languages Act, 1969].
19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
20. Official Languages Act, 1969, supra note 18, s 11
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public. More importantly, for the purposes of this article, section 19(1) of the
Charter protects the right to be heard in one’s official language but it does not
specify whether that imposes an obligation of bilingualism on the part of the
sitting judge or judges. The Supreme Court of Canada itself got entangled in this
debate in the 1986 case Société des Acadiens v Association of Parents21 in which it
had to decide whether the right to be heard in one’s official language includes
the right to be heard by a panel of judges fluent in that language. Even though
the case concerned the capacity of a judge from New Brunswick to understand a
case brought in French pursuant to section 19(2) of the Charter, the necessity of
having judges with sufficient proficiency in French and English at the Supreme
Court of Canada itself was also indirectly at play.
In Société des Acadiens, the majority held that “there is no language guarantee
[in the Constitution] … that the speaker will be heard or understood, or that
he has the right to be heard or understood in the language of his choice.”22 The
Court thus closed the door to an interpretation of section 19(1) of the Charter
which would require all its members to be bilingual.23 The new 1988 Official
Languages Act partly remedied the situation by providing a requirement for all
federal courts to be institutionally bilingual, i.e., that the judges hearing a case
must be able to understand the parties in the official language of their choice
“without the assistance of an interpreter.”24 The Official Languages Act does not
require all members of a given court to be bilingual, but only those hearing a
case that requires the mastery of both official languages. In practice, this leaves
enough room for chief justices to make sure that they have enough bilingual
judges to fulfill their institutional obligations. The Official Languages Act,
however, explicitly excludes the Supreme Court of Canada from its ambit.25 The
Court is thus now the only court with federal jurisdiction where a Francophone
litigant cannot be sure that, were they to choose to plead their case in French,

21. Société des Acadiens v Association of Parents, [1986] 1 SCR 549, 27 DLR (4th) 406.
22. Ibid at 574-75.
23. Power and Roy note, however, that if the courts were to revisit Société des acadiens, it could
in all likelihood be overturned in light of many decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
since then, including R v Beaulac, [1999] 1 SCR 768, 173 DLR (4th) 193. See Mark C
Power & Marc-André Roy, “Le droit d’être compris directement par les tribunaux canadiens,
à l’oral comme à l’écrit, sans l’entremise de services d’interprétation et de traduction”
(2015) 45 RGD 403 at 425-26. See also, Alyssa Tomkins, “Does Beaulac Reorient Judicial
bilingualism?” (2008) 39 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 171.
24. Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), s 16(1)(a).
25. Ibid, s 16(1).
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they would be understood by the full panel of judges hearing the case without the
assistance of an interpreter.
Before we move forward, it should be noted that our study is not a theoretical
or a doctrinal examination of linguistic rights.26 Our analysis is meant to inform
the debate about judicial bilingualism and to complement it with empirical
evidence. The increased interest in this question, since approximately 2006,
appears to us to be driven by political debates rather than doctrinal developments.
Despite the sensitivity of the issue, no thorough study has empirically assessed
the actual impact of bilingualism and unilingualism on the Supreme Court of
Canada. Even if doctrinal debates have an important role to play in this on-going
discussion, our analysis is meant to inform the broader political debate about this
important policy choice. Notwithstanding our hope that this study will inform
future normative debates, it should be seen first and foremost as a contribution
to the growing empirical literature on judicial behaviour in Canada. By focusing
on language proficiency, we hope to shed light on an important aspect of a judge’s
background that is rarely (if ever) studied by scholars of judicial behaviour.
The article is divided in four parts. In Part I, we discuss the framing of the
debate about judicial bilingualism in Canada over the last decade and survey the
empirical literature on bilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada. In Part II,
we outline the difficulty of studying bilingualism at the Court and explain the
methodology and coding techniques we have relied on for this study. In Part
III, we present the main findings of this study namely, the relationship between
language and panel size, assertiveness, caseload, and deference. In Part IV,
we discuss the signification of these results and suggest some avenues for further
research on judicial bilingualism in Canada and other jurisdictions.

I. FRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT BILINGUALISM:
LANGUAGE AS A LEGAL OR AN IDENTITY
REQUIREMENT?
The politically charged debate about bilingualism of Supreme Court of Canada
judges emerged into prominence after 2006. During their reign from 1993 to
2006, the federal Liberals had appointed only functionally bilingual judges to the
highest court, at least according to our own classification which we discuss below.
However, since the appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Court in
26. For a doctrinal analysis of constitutional linguistic rights and their impact on bilingualism at
the Supreme Court of Canada see e.g. Power & Roy, supra note 23.

722

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

2006, the debate about the bilingual capacities of Supreme Court of Canada
judges has been ignited multiple times and has not seemed to diminish in intensity.
A. DEBATING MANDATORY BILINGUALISM FOR SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA JUDGES

On 1 March 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper selected Justice Rothstein
from a shortlist left by the former Liberal government as his first nomination
to the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice Rothstein was known to be an acute
legal mind but his nomination was subject to criticism because he did not speak
French.27 Despite being questioned on this issue during his appearance before the
Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee reviewing his nomination, his appointment
did not trigger immediate intense political controversy. However, it has had
considerable ripple effects in setting the footing for arguments that surfaced soon
thereafter. Since then, nine bills have been tabled in the House of Commons to
address the issue of bilingualism at the Court.
When Justice Michel Bastarache resigned in 2008 and the Conservative
government of Stephen Harper was tasked with choosing his successor as its first
full Supreme Court of Canada appointee, many were scared by the possibility
that a government seen as having little sympathy for official bilingualism might
appoint a unilingual judge from the Maritimes. In anticipation of this eventuality,
in May 2008, following the nomination of Justice Rothstein, then-Liberal MP
Denis Coderre introduced Bill C-548 to amend the Official Languages Act and to
require that judges of the Supreme Court of Canada understand oral argument
in both official languages without the assistance of an interpreter.28 Similarly,
Bill C-559 introduced in June 2008 would have amended section 5 of the
Supreme Court Act to add bilingualism as a requirement for Supreme Court of
Canada judges.29 Both bills died on the order paper. After the general election of
October 2008, Bill C-232, similar in substance to C-559, was first introduced
in November 2008, and again in January 2009, and March 2010 respectively in

27. See e.g. Yves Boisvert, “Un processus utile et sans danger,” La Presse (28 February 2006),
online: <numerique.banq.qc.ca/patrimoine/details/52327/2203140?docsearchtext=Roths
tein%20bilingue>.
28. Bill C-548, An Act to Amend the Official Languages Act (understanding the official languages
– judges of the Supreme Court of Canada), 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (Sponsored by D
Coderre) [Bill C-548].
29. Bill C-559, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 2nd
Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (Sponsored by Y Godin).
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the first, second, and third sessions of the 40th Parliament.30 Bill C-232 finally
passed through the House of Commons but died on the Order Paper while at
the Second Reading stage in the Senate when the 2011 federal elections were
called. During that time, Stephen Harper appointed Justice Thomas Cromwell
to the Supreme Court of Canada at the end of 2008. With the nomination of
Justice Cromwell, a bilingual judge from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, the
question of Supreme Court bilingualism temporarily receded to the political
background despite the continuous pressure from opposition parties to enshrine
this requirement into law.
The May 2011 general federal election provided Stephen Harper’s
Conservatives with their first majority government. Shortly after the election,
NDP Member of Parliament Yvon Godin introduced Bill C-208, which was
similar in substance to Bill C-232, on 13 June 2011.31 The issue was thus already
a hot topic when Prime Minister Harper appointed to the Supreme Court of
Canada, on 21 October 2011, Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Michael
Moldaver, both from the Court of Appeal for Ontario. Justice Karakatsanis
became fluent in French thanks to a French immersion program in Quebec
for federal judges administered by the Office of the Commissioner for Federal
Judicial Affairs of Canada. She had attended the program for two weeks every
summer during the past eight years and, though not completely trilingual (she
also speaks Greek), she could still show a very respectable mastery of the French
language. However, when Justice Moldaver was questioned by members of
the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee of the House of Commons about his
fluency in French, he had to apologize for his complete lack of knowledge of
the language and to recognize that he had let pass all the opportunities that
Justice Karakatsnis had seized to learn French.32 Justice Moldaver was the second
unilingual anglophone to be appointed by Stephen Harper to the highest court
in less than five years following the appointment of Justice Rothstein in 2006.
30. Bill C-232, An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 3rd
Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (Sponsored by Y Godin) [Bill C-232].
31. Bill C-208, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 1st
Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (Sponsored by Y Godin). This bill was again reinstated in 2013 but
was defeated on second reading on 7 May 2014. Bill C-208, An Act to amend the Supreme
Court Act (understanding the official languages), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, (Sponsored by Y Godin);
House of Commons, Hansard, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 82 (7 May 2014), online: <www.
ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/house/sitting-82/hansard>.
32. Hélène Buzzetti, “Nominations à la Cour suprême – Mauvais quart d’heure pour le juge
Moldaver,” Le Devoir (20 October 2011), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/
334020/nominations-a-la-cour-supreme-mauvais-quart-d-heure-pour-le-juge-moldaver>.
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The issue had been so hotly debated that the Liberals, elected into government
in October 2015, promised during the 2015 federal campaign to appoint only
bilingual judges to the Court but did not go so far as to promise to entrench such
a requirement into statute.33 Accordingly, Prime Minister Trudeau released a new
administrative procedure on 2 August 2016 for the appointment to the Court.34
Under this new process, “an independent and non-partisan [seven member]
Advisory Board has been given the task of identifying suitable candidates who
are jurists of the highest caliber, functionally bilingual, and representative of the
diversity of our great country.”35
The application questionnaire comprises a section asking candidates whether
they are able, without further training, (1) to read and understand court materials
in both official languages; (2) to discuss legal matters with their colleagues in
both official languages; (3) to converse with counsel in court in both official
languages; and (4) to understand oral submissions in both official languages.36
This express requirement of functional bilingualism was not met with universal
approval. The Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association (“the Association”)
introduced in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court a constitutional challenge to the

33. In its 2015 electoral platform, the Liberal Party of Canada wrote: “We will ensure that
all those appointed to the Supreme Court are functionally bilingual.” See Liberal Party of
Canada, “Real Change: A New Plan For A Strong Middle Class” (2015), online: <www.
liberal.ca/files/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf>.
34. Prime Minister of Canada, News Release, “New process for judicial appointments to the
Supreme Court of Canada” (2 August 2016), online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/08/02/
prime-minister-announces-new-supreme-court-canada-judicial-appointments-process>.
35. Ibid [emphasis added]. The Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs,
on its website, to which the new appointment procedures refer, has defined functional
bilingualism as:
The Government has committed to only appoint judges who are functionally bilingual. The
Supreme Court hears appeals in both English and French. Written materials may be submitted
in either official language and counsel may present oral argument in the official language of
their choice. Judges may ask questions in English or French. It is expected that a Supreme
Court judge can read materials and understand oral argument without the need for translation
or interpretation in French and English. Ideally, the judge can converse with counsel during
oral argument and with other judges of the Court in French or English.

Canada, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Qualifications and
Assessment Criteria” (2016), online: <www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/scc-csc/qualifications-eng.html>
[Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, “Qualifications and Assessment Criteria”].
36. Canada, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Questionnaire for
the Supreme Court of Canada Judicial Appointment Process” (2016), online: <www.fja-cmf.
gc.ca/scc-csc/Questionnaire-SCC-Judicial-Appointment-Process.pdf> at 4.
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new procedure,37 arguing that it jeopardizes regional representation among the
Court, which they characterized as a constitutional convention. Even though the
Association did not explicitly address the question of bilingualism, others in the
Atlantic Provinces went the extra mile and argued that mandatory bilingualism
conflicts with regional representation at the Court in general.38 On 17 October
2016, Prime Minister Trudeau selected Justice Malcolm Rowe, a bilingual
judge from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, from among the
short-listed candidates submitted by the Advisory Board to fill the seat left vacant
by the retirement of Justice Cromwell on 1 September 2016.39 The appointment
of Justice Rowe proved critics from the Atlantic Provinces wrong and the
Association decided to drop its constitutional challenge.
Separately, Senator Murray Sinclair, former Chairman of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and Perry Bellegarde, National Chief of the Assembly
of First Nations, raised concerns that mandatory bilingualism would impose an
additional burden on potential First Nations judges in that they would have to
learn not one, but two additional languages to qualify for the top court.40
Both bodies agree, in substance, that mandatory functional bilingualism is
discriminatory insofar as it trumps other important elements, such as regional
37. Sean Fine, “Lawyers challenge Ottawa on Supreme Court appointment changes,” The
Globe & Mail (19 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
lawyers-challenge-ottawa-on-changes-to-supreme-court-appointments/article31951207>.
38. See e.g. Jackson Doughart, “Supreme Court can be bilingual without every judge being
so,” Chronicle Herald 12 August 2016), online: <thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1388032opinion-supreme-court-can-be-bilingual-without-every-judge-being-so>. These concerns
echo those of former Justice John Major who expressed the view that mandatory bilingualism
would be detrimental to Western representation on the Court. See Janice Tibbetts, “Legal
community divided over bilingualism on Supreme Court,” Vancouver Sun (2 May 2010),
online: <www.vancouversun.com/Legal+community+divided+over+bilingualism+Supreme+C
ourt/2977850/story.html>.
39. Chantal Hébert, “Rowe’s Supreme Court appointment sets bilingualism bar quite
a bit higher,” Toronto Star (27 October 2016), online: <www.thestar.com/news/
canada/2016/10/27/rowes-supreme-court-appointment-sets-bilingualism-bar-quite-a-bithigher-hbert.html>.
40. Kristy Kirkup, “Top court’s bilingual rule a barrier to indigenous judges: Sinclair, Bellegrade,”
The Globe & Mail (22 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
supreme-courts-bilingual-requirement-unfair-sinclair-bellegarde/article32011596>.
It is noteworthy, however, that according to the 2016 national census, only 15.6 per cent
of the Canadian Aboriginal population reported being able to conduct a conversation in
an Aboriginal language. See Canada, Statistics Canada, “Census in brief: The Aboriginal
languages of First Nations people, Métis and Inuit” (25 October 2017), online: <www12.
statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016022/98-200-x2016022
-eng.cfm>. We thank an anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out this statistic.
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or minority representation, that should play a more prominent role in the
appointment process.
In October 2017, anticipating the appointment of a judge from western
provinces to replace Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin who would retire at the
end of 2017, NDP Member of Parliament François Choquette tabled two bills
successively that were similar in substance to the ones which had been introduced
in the previous years—one amending the Supreme Court Act41 and the other
amending the Official Languages Act.42 The Liberal government, with their new
administrative appointment procedure in place, decided to vote against the bills.
Bill C-203, which would have amended the Supreme Court Act was defeated in
the House of Commons on 25 October 2017 even though 17 Liberal Members
of Parliament broke ranks. At the time this article was written, the other bill
was still at first reading. These bills have rehashed once more the arguments that
have now become common place about mandatory bilingualism for Supreme
Court of Canada judges. NDP Member of Parliament and renowned advocate
of Indigenous rights Romeo Saganash argued, for example, that the bill would
“perpetuate colonialism.”43 The federal NDP Leader, Jagmeet Singh, followed
step after the nomination of Justice Sheilah L. Martin, on 29 October 2017
in replacement of Chief Justice McLachlin. However, like the appointment of
Justice Rowe a year earlier, the appointment of Justice Martin, a bilingual judge
of the Alberta Court of Appeal, seems to have appeased for now the concerns of
the advocates of mandatory bilingualism.

41. Bill C-203, An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding of the official languages),
1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2015 (Sponsored by F Choquette).
42. Bill C-382, An Act to Amend the Official Languages Act (Supreme Court of Canada), 1st Sess,
42nd Parl, 2017 (Sponsored by F Choquette).
43. Hélène Buzzetti, “Romeo Saganash combat le bilinguisme à la canadienne,” Le
Devoir (9 November 2017) online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/512463/
saganash-s-oppose-au-bilinguisme-colonial-a-la-cour-supreme>.
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B. FRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT MANDATORY BILINGUALISM

The debate about bilingualism of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada
has been framed around two competing categories: language as an identity and
language as a legal requirement.44
In the first category which we term “language as an identity requirement,”
commentators have argued that bilingualism is an asset necessary to represent
Quebec and other francophone communities in the judicial system.45 While
being desirable, various political commentators like Barbara Kay,46 politicians
like former Minister of Justice Rob Nicholson47 and former Supreme Court
of Canada judge Justice John Major48 have expressed the obvious concern that
mandatory bilingualism would narrow the pool of competent candidates and
44. We were tempted to use Hugo Cyr’s formulation of “adjudicative capacity” as opposed to
“judicial legitimacy.” However, we thought that talking about identity and legal requirement
was closer in spirit to the empirical literature on judicial decision-making. See Hugo Cyr,
“The Bungling of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014)
67 SCLR (2d) 73. The difference in the framing of linguistic proficiency for Supreme Court
of Canada judges tracks more general debates about the desirability of official bilingualism.
François Charbonneau finds that Anglo-Canadian advocates of bilingualism generally frame
it as a question of principle while adversaries generally object to mandatory bilingualism
on pragmatic grounds. Both groups thus generally talk past each other according to
Charbonneau. The debate about mandatory bilingualism for Supreme Court of Canada
judges seems to follow a similar pattern. See François Charbonneau, “Un dialogue de
sourds?: Les arguments invoqués par les défenseurs et les détracteurs du bilinguisme dans
l’espace anglo-canadien” (2015) 5 Min Ling & Soc 13.
45. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have adhered at least in part to this
“identity” requirement regarding judges coming from Quebec in the Nadon Reference. The
majority wrote:
The purpose of s. 6 is to ensure not only civil law training and experience on the Court, but also
to ensure that Quebec’s distinct legal traditions and social values are represented on the Court,
thereby enhancing the confidence of the people of Quebec in the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of their rights. Put differently, s. 6 protects both the functioning and the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court as a general court of appeal for Canada [emphasis in original].

See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at para 49, [2014] 1 SCR 433
[Nadon Reference].
46. See e.g. Charles Huband, “Unilingualism needs no apology,” Winnipeg Free Press
(23 December 2011), online: <www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/analysis/
unilingualism-needs-no-apology-136178703.html>.
47. See e.g. the comments of then-Minister of Justice Rob Nicholson
on this issue, La Presse canadienne, “Nomination des Juges:
Le mérite plus crucial que le bilinguisme, dit Nicholson,” Le Devoir (12
November 2012), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/363793/
nomination-des-juges-le-merite-plus-crucial-que-le-bilinguisme-dit-nicholson>.
48. Tibbetts, supra note 38.
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make the selection process unfair for those who might not have had the chance
to grow up in a multilingual environment.49 This complaint is arguably a fair
point when one considers that, according to the 2011 Census, only 10.2 per cent
of the Canadian population outside of Quebec could sustain a conversation in
French.50 Moreover, this “identity” requirement could conflict with other valid
identities and prevent their representation on the Court. In other words, for those
opposing mandatory bilingualism, appointing bilingual judges should not trump
the appointment of, for example, women, visible minorities, or First Nations
judges. These considerations share in common the fact that they see fluency in
both official languages as an extra-legal factor,51 i.e., as a factor that is valuable in
that it makes the Court more representative of one linguistic community or more
attuned to the social dynamics in some segments of the Canadian population,
but not as a legal competence per se. Just like the fact of being a woman is
not supposed to influence the content of the law, one can argue that women
judges have a different perspective on certain issues and they bring into their
legal judgment these valuable extra-legal considerations.52 By analogy, speaking
French can connect a judge to the social reality of francophones and this might
49. See Barbara Kay, “Of course Justin Trudeau wants bilingual judges: he’s the product
of bilingual privilege,” National Post (28 July 2015), online: <news.nationalpost.com/
full-comment/barbara-kay-of-course-justin-trudeau-wants-bilingual-judges-hes-the-productof-bilingual-privilege>.
50. The numbers are almost the same for the 2016 Census with 10.3 per cent. See Canada,
Statistics Canada, “English, French and Official Minorities Languages in Canada” (2 August
2017), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016011/98200-x2016011-eng.cfm>.
51. The case of First Nations judges is somewhat more complex. What we say here is not that
First Nations judges would not bring valuable legal competence in their Indigenous tradition
to the bench. What we say is simply that the complaint of advocates of First Nations judges
seems to imply that proficiency in French is not a legal competence.
52. For a defence of this view, see Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a
Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ 507. In the Canadian context, the empirical
evidence regarding this question seems to be mixed and inconclusive. Compare Peter
McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis by Appeal
Court Data” (1993) 8 CJLS 135 and James Stribopoulos & Moin A Yahya, “Does a Judge’s
Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario,” (2007) 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 315. For a recent review of the
literature in the Canadian context, see Donald R Songer, Miroslava Radieva & Rebecca Reid,
“Gender Diversity in the Intermediate Appellate Courts of Canada” (2016) 37 Just System
J 4. The idea that women judges bring a different perspective to judging more generally is
often times influenced by the work of Carol Gilligan. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theories and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
For a critical discussion of Gilligan’s ideas, especially in the judicial context, see Jennifer
Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 91.
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influence their outlook on certain issues. From a slightly different, though related
perspective, Supreme Court of Canada judges should arguably reflect or represent
Canadian diversity and, thus, knowledge of French and English gives preference
to one specific identity at the expense of other identities more prevalent in the
composition of Canadian society.
We term the second approach “language as a legal requirement.” Supporters
of this conception include former-Commissioner of Official Languages Graham
Fraser,53 former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé,54
former University of Ottawa professor Sebastien Grammond,55 and the author
and legal commentator Philip Slayton.56 All of these individuals emphasize that
speaking French is an essential part of the Canadian lawyer’s toolkit. As former
Supreme Court of Canada justice and prominent advocate of Canadian
bilingualism Justice Bastarache points out, given that federal laws as well as the
laws of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, New-Brunswick, and Newfoundland and
Labrador are enacted in both official languages and that both versions have equal
status, the ability to read the original legal text in both languages is a very useful
interpretive tool.57 Moreover, knowing both official languages gives the judge
access to a wider range of doctrinal writings and judicial opinions from lower
courts across the country and increases the quantity of legal information that can
feed into the decision-making process.
Those two approaches entail very different assumptions about the impact of
bilingualism on judicial behaviour. Not all of them are easily measurable however.
We discuss this in more detail in Parts III and IV below.

53. Commissioner of Official Languages, Beyond Obligations: Annual report 2009-2010, vol I
(Canada: Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 2010) at 32. See also Graham
Fraser, “In defence of a bilingual Supreme Court,” Maclean’s (2 August 2016), online: <www.
macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/in-defence-of-a-bilingual-supreme-court>.
54. Hélène Buzzetti, “Cour Suprême – Le Bilinguisme des juges est essentiel, dit Claire L’HeureuxDubé,” Le Devoir (27 April 2010), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/287807/
cour-supreme-le-bilinguisme-des-juges-est-essentiel-dit-claire-l-heureux-dube>.
55. See e.g. Sebastien Grammond & Mark Power, Should Supreme Court Judges be Required to be
Bilingual? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 2011).
56. See e.g. Philip Slayton, Mighty Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Runs your Life
(Toronto: Allan Lane Canada, 2011) at 250.
57. Charter, supra note 19, s. 18(1). Michel Bastarache, The Law of Bilingual Interpretation
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2008). Perhaps because of his status as a defender of Canadian
bilingualism, Justice Bastarache refused to take a side on the issue of mandatory bilingualism
for Supreme Court judges. See also Michel Bastarache, “Bilingual Interpretation Rules as A
Component of Language Rights in Canada” in Lawrence M Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 159.
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C. MEASURING JUDICIAL BILINGUALISM

Leaving aside the normative debate, there seems to be some empirical evidence
that the Supreme Court, as an institution, remains largely unilingual. For
example, a study by Peter McCormick published in 2004 suggests that the level
of penetration of francophone ideas was not as high as anglophone ideas.58 Only
one out of the twenty authors most cited by the Court during the 1985-2004
period wrote mainly in French (Albert Mayrand).59 Moreover, of the twenty
most cited journal articles, only one was in French and was cited only four
times while many other articles in English were cited much more frequently.
Though McCormick himself did not break down the ratio of French and English
citations, Sebastien Grammond and Mark Power, using his numbers, found that
the ratio of citations of English and French publications by the Court in the
1985-2004 period was 7:1.60
Another study conducted by Black and Richter suggests that, between 1985
and 1990, the number of citations of anglophone treatises outnumbered by far
francophone ones.61 Out of the sixteen most cited legal treatises, the only French
one was tied for last place with two other English treatises.62
Having reviewed this body of literature, Grammond and Power
summarize it as follows:
[U]nilingual judges […] are unable to draw upon the rich body of Canadian
literature written in French. […] The general picture that emerges from those
studies is one where English-language books and articles overwhelmingly dominate,
and French-language texts are mostly cited in judgments dealing with civil law or
other issues peculiar to Quebec.63

Academics have suggested that the lower penetration of francophone legal
ideas is not limited to the citation of law journal articles or legal treatises. For
example, Professor Michel Doucet of the University of Moncton argued that
unilingual judges in general might have a hard time following oral arguments

58. Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by The
Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-2004” (2004) 83 Can Bar Rev 633 [McCormick, “Judges
and Journals”].
59. Ibid.
60. Grammond & Power, supra note 55, n 26.
61. Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, “Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic
Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990” (1993) 16 Dal LJ 378.
62. Ibid.
63. Grammond & Power, supra note 55 at 9.
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or written submissions in French, therefore leading to wrong decisions.64 This
is obviously a matter of great concern, but it is also highly speculative and it
remains to be seen how this hypothesis could be empirically tested.
Despite those cogent debates, no study has tried to empirically measure
the actual impact of unilingualism on the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision-making. There have been alleged consequences and indirect evidence
about the impact of francophone ideas but no direct measurement of the actual
impact of unilingualism. This kind of enterprise can be difficult because language
probably plays a marginal role among many other factors. However, we are
confident that when the decisions are pooled together, it is possible to see some
trends and some differences between judges who can and those who cannot speak
French. We will now turn to the measures of the impact of unilingualism and
bilingualism on judicial behaviour at the Supreme Court of Canada.

II. DATA SET
In order to perform an empirical analysis of the behaviour of unilingual and
bilingual judges, we combined data that we generated on the language proficiency
of each judge to the dataset of Supreme Court of Canada decisions compiled
by professors Andrew Green and Benjamin Alarie of the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law.65 Our analysis uses all of the Court’s decisions from January
1969 to July 2013 and compares judges’ behaviour depending on whether
they heard cases argued in English or French. In three of the four dimensions
explored—panel-size, assertiveness and caseload—our data suggests that the
judges’ behaviour is correlated to their level of mastery of both official languages.
This article does not purport to be a statistically significant prediction of the
behaviour of unilingual judges; it is simply an empirical analysis of the plausibility
of some alleged impacts of the appointment of unilingual judges to the Supreme
Court of Canada.

64. Canada, Justice and Human Rights Committee of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl
(15 June 2009) (Michel Doucet), online: <openparliament.ca/committees/justice/40-2/31/
michel-doucet-1/only> [Doucet, Justice and Human Rights Committee].
65. For more information on their dataset, see Benjamin A Alarie & Andrew J Green,
Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts: A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional
Constraints on Judges, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) [Alarie & Green, Commitment
and Cooperation].
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A. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY DATA

We coded all 42 judges of the Supreme Court of Canada who served between
1969 and 2013 according to their linguistic capacities. We grouped them in three
broad language categories: (1) unilingual (anglophone), (2) “unknown,” and (3)
bilingual. In order to tease out the effect of regional origin, we divided the bilingual
category in two: bilingual from Quebec, and bilingual from the rest of Canada.
Even though it is difficult to assess objectively the actual level of proficiency of
judges in French and English, we have relied on three elements to categorize
them. We first looked at objective biographical elements as published on the
Court’s website.66 We ranked in the bilingual category all judges who have had
a bilingual education, i.e., who have studied in two different institutions, one of
which is anglophone and the other one francophone. Surprisingly, eleven judges
(26 per cent) had a bilingual education.67 Then, we looked at their professional
experience and ranked in the bilingual category the judges who had significant
work experience in the two official languages. Finally, for the remaining judges
we looked at subjective assessments of their proficiency in French either by their
biographers or by the mainstream media (such as printed newspapers). Judges
identified as unilingual are exclusively English speakers.
Unilingual: Estey, Dickson, McIntyre, Wilson, Sopinka, Stevenson, Major,
Rothstein, Moldaver
Unknown: Martland, Ritchie, Spence, Laskin
Bilingual from R of Canada: Cartwright, Judson, Hall, La Forest, Cory, McLachlin,
Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, Abella, Charron, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Le
Dain
Bilingual from Quebec: Abbott, Fauteux, Pigeon, Beetz, de Grandpré, Pratte,
Chouinard, Lamer, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Wagner

For the subjective assessment, we had to establish a cut-off point. Since the
bills introduced on mandatory bilingualism and the new appointment procedure
use the criterion of understanding oral argument without the assistance of an
interpreter, we used this criterion as the cut-off. It is important to note that this
criterion should not always be taken as the appropriate threshold for any kind of
study. For example, if one wants to assess the level of penetration of francophone
academic legal ideas among anglophone judges, one might want to look at a judge’s
ability to read French, not necessarily to understand it orally. Likewise, if one
66. Short biographies of all past and present justices are available at Supreme Court of Canada,
“Judges of the Court,” online: <www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/index-eng.aspx>.
67. These are Justices Abbott, Hall, Beetz, de Grandpré, Pratte, Chouinard, Le Dain, Gonthier,
LeBel, Deschamps, and Fish.
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wants to assess whether francophone judges can work in French at the Court,
as the former Commissioner of Official Languages Graham Fraser among others
have suggested, one might want to look at a judge’s capacity to speak French.68
However, since this is the first study on the question, we have decided to rely on
the threshold used by the main advocates of mandatory bilingualism in the legal
community,69—the capacity to “read materials and understand oral argument
without the need for translation or interpretation in French and English.”70
With this criterion in mind, there were still borderline cases. For example,
in their biography on Chief Justice Brian Dickson, Robert J. Sharpe and Kent
Roach explain that Dickson learned French while he was sitting on the bench but
never became fluent. They say:
After his appointment at the Supreme Court of Canada, Dickson took regular
lessons from a French-language tutor and participated in summer immersion
programs for judges, including a session at Laval University when he stayed with a
French family. His modest proficiency in French perhaps never quite matched his
genuine enthusiasm for bilingualism, but, in his early years on the Court, the other
anglophone judges had such limited capacity in French that he regularly sat on leave
applications and appeals from Quebec. He asked Chief Justice Gérard Fauteux, who
served as chief justice for less than a year after Dickson’s appointment to the Court,
whether he should spend his time learning civil law or French and ‘he very strongly
advised learning some more French’. He prepared himself for hearing Quebec
appeals with meticulous care, even to the extent of figuring out the questions he
would put to counsel and having his questions translated in advance of the oral
hearing. He even wrote a short judgment in French, with much help from Pigeon.71

Because he could not formulate his questions directly in French and because
his level of proficiency in French was low (or non-existent) when he arrived at the
Court, we ranked him as unilingual.
Ellen Anderson, in her biography of Justice Bertha Wilson writes:
Wilson’s spoken French (somewhat Scots-accented in accordance with her selfproclaimed status as a member of an ‘oral minority’) was clearly competent. She
could read French slowly but confidently; occasionally she would call on her court
attendant, Jean-Marie Plourde, for help when she got stuck with an idiom. But in
no way did she consider herself to be bilingual, comfortably capable of following
the oral submissions of French-speaking counsel or the questions put to counsel
by the French-speaking members of the Court. ‘There wasn’t a day passed that I
68. See also Fraser, supra note 53.
69. See e.g. Grammond & Power, supra note 55. Bill C-232, supra note 30 and Bill
C-548, supra note 28.
70. Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, “Qualifications and Assessment
Criteria,” supra note 35.
71. Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode Society
for Canadian Legal History, 2003) at 413.
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didn’t feel that I was missing something through that gap’ she said, adding, ‘I can
remember counsel, one French-speaking counsel whose whole argument had been
conducted in French saying one day, “I know that Justice Wilson is desperate to ask
a question and she is not doing it because she does not think she can articulate it in
French, please do it in English, I am perfectly fluent in English.”’ He was right; she
swallowed her embarrassment and spoke up.72

Because Justice Wilson could hardly formulate a question in French and
because she reports that she was missing parts of the arguments going on in
French, we also ranked her as unilingual.
The most difficult case was perhaps Justice Bora Laskin. Philip Girard’s
biography on the former Chief Justice does not address the specific issue of
his fluency in French, even if he acknowledges that Chief Justice Laskin was
not especially comfortable in French.73 According to Girard’s—who clerked for
Estey in 1979-1980—best recollections,74 Laskin could read French but was not
bilingual. As best as he can remember, and according also to one of Girard’s
colleagues who clerked for Chief Justice Laskin in 1981-1982, Alan N. Young,
Chief Justice Laskin did not use earphones for simultaneous translation during
oral arguments conducted in French. However, as Girard himself admits, his
recollections go back more than 30 years ago and it would be difficult now to give
an objective assessment of Chief Justice Laskin’s proficiency in French. We ranked
Chief Justice Laskin in the “unknown” category.
We ranked the judges for which there was not enough information in the
“unknown” category to minimize the impact of a wrong coding. Overall, four
judges were ranked in this category because of lack of information.75 That being
said, the behaviour of those judges was close to those ranked in the unilingual
category and suggest that they were probably closer to unilingual than bilingual.
Because we studied only the impact of English unilingualism, we have
decided to code all francophone judges as bilingual. There are three reasons for
this. First, it is generally agreed that on average the proficiency in English of
francophone judges is much higher than the proficiency in French of anglophone
judges.76 Second, if there is little objective information about the level of
proficiency in French of anglophone judges, there is virtually no information
whatsoever about the proficiency in English of francophone judges (except
72. Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, 2001) at 186.
73. Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History, 2005) at 430.
74. Email from Philip Girard, (1 April 2016) on file with author.
75. These are Justices Martland, Ritchie, Spence, and Chief Justice Laskin.
76. See Russell, supra note 14. See also Buzzetti, supra note 54.

Rubin, Rubin, Unilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada 735

for the objective biographical elements identified above). Third, as the level of
proficiency in English demonstrated by francophone judges is generally high,
drawing a boundary between them could be difficult. Creating two linguistic
categories for francophone judges would exaggerate minor differences, reporting
them as bigger than they are in reality.
The list of all judges who served between 1969 and 2013 with their respective
coding and the reason for such coding are found in Appendix A of this article.
B. SAMPLE

We examined all decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1969 to 2013
compiled by Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green of the Faculty of Law at the
University of Toronto.77 We have used this time-frame for two reasons. First,
the only in-depth analysis of the impact of language proficiency on judicial
decision-making at the Supreme Court of Canada by Peter H. Russell was
published in 1969 and we thought it was time to revisit some of the reasons
that motivated his work as part of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism.78 The study by Russell is a great source of information and of
qualitative and quantitative analysis. However, Russell did not attempt to classify
systematically all judges according to their proficiency in French and English.
Though he discussed some judges’ specific level of fluency in French, he only
relied on the province of origin when quantitatively assessing judicial behaviour.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study of judicial behaviour that
takes language proficiency as the independent variable. Second, the first Official
Languages Act was originally passed in 1969 and we thought it would be interesting
to measure whether this general milestone in Canadian linguistic policy, despite
the lack of a formal entrenchment of mandatory bilingualism for Supreme Court
of Canada judges, has had an impact on judicial behaviour.
In order to identify cases likely to have been argued in French, we have
used the decisions from the Quebec Court of Appeal as a proxy for francophone
cases. This entails two obvious limitations. First, this obscures the fact that
other cases from the rest of Canada can bring into play the requirement of
mandatory institutional bilingualism. However, we assume that these are rather
marginal since the proportion of francophones outside Quebec has always been
significantly smaller than the proportion of anglophones in Quebec during the
period we are studying. Thus, there was a higher probability, ceteris paribus, that
cases in our sample were argued in English in Quebec than that cases were argued
77. The information regarding the coding and the data set can be found in Alarie & Green,
Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 65.
78. Russell, supra note 14.
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in French in the rest of Canada. Even if our categorization ranks francophone
cases from the rest of Canada in our “English” category and anglophone cases
from Quebec in our “French” category, by doing so we erred on the side of
caution and potentially down-played the actual impact of language on judicial
behaviour. Second, we are conscious that some cases from the Federal Court
of Appeal might have been argued in French. Because it is harder, in terms of
coding, to assess the language used by the Federal Court of Appeal we decided
to leave them aside and to include them in our anglophone category. Again,
if we were able to disentangle Federal Court of Appeal cases that were argued in
French from those that were argued in English, the differences might be starker.
Here again we erred on the side of caution.
The cases are therefore grouped in two categories depending on their regional
origin – i.e., cases from Quebec and cases from the Rest of Canada (“RoC”),
including the Federal Court of Appeal. Throughout the remainder of this article,
we will constantly compare judges’ behaviour when faced with these two broad
categories of cases: cases likely to have been argued in English (RoC cases) and
cases likely to have been argued in French (Quebec cases). In order to tease out
the impact of legal specialization in civil or common law, our analysis is also
restricted to federal law cases, i.e., cases for which all judges are supposed to
have a more or less equal knowledge of the law. These areas of federal law are:
aboriginal law, administrative law, citizenship, immigration and refugee law, civil
rights and liberties and human rights, criminal law and procedure, division of
powers, intellectual property law, and international law.

III. FINDINGS
Looking at all federal law cases from 1969 to 2013, we measured four different
potential impacts of judicial unilingualism. We tried to assess whether it affects:
(a) the size and the composition of the panel, (b) the level of assertiveness of
individual judges, (c) the linguistic composition of the caseload of each judge
and, (d) the level of deference towards francophone appellate courts.
A. PANEL SIZE AND COMPOSITION

We first looked at the size of the panel in cases originating from Quebec to see if
language proficiency could be determinant of the panel size. Our first hypothesis
can be stated thus:
H1: Since unilingual judges might have a harder time understanding cases coming from
Quebec because they are argued in French, they will be assigned to fewer Quebec cases
and the average panel-size for cases from Quebec will be smaller.
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Unsurprisingly, the average size of the panel for all cases coming from Quebec
(6.57), regardless of the area of law, was significantly smaller than cases from
the rest of Canada (7.11). One easy explanation is that civil law cases coming
from Quebec are generally heard by smaller panels, therefore reducing the overall
average panel-size for Quebec cases.79
As previously noted, to tease out the impact of legal specialization in civil
and common law from the impact of linguistic proficiency, we looked at the
average panel size in areas of federal law only. Overall, for federal law cases, the
average panel-size between 1969 and 2013 was 7.45 judges for the RoC and
7.18 judges for Quebec cases. The difference between the average panel-size for
cases coming from Quebec (7.18) compared with those coming from the rest of
Canada (7.45) is thus also smaller in federal law cases and cannot be explained by
legal specialization. Moreover, federal law cases coming from Quebec are heard
on average by significantly smaller panels than federal law cases coming from the
rest of Canada regardless of the time period: As shown in Table 1, the discrepancy
is observed across the courts of all chief justices. The only three provinces whose
differences in average panel size are statistically significant80 are Quebec with an
average of 7.18 judges, Newfoundland and Labrador with an average of 6.75
judges, and Ontario with an average of 7.69 judges. The smaller average panel-size
for Newfoundland and Labrador can be explained by the higher proportion of
“as of right” cases coming to the Court from this province during this period
since they tend to be heard by smaller panels. The proportion of “as of right”
cases from Newfoundland and Labrador (57 per cent) was the highest among all
provinces and substantially higher than the national average (30 per cent). The
proportion of “as of right” appeals from Quebec (29 per cent), in comparison,
was close to the national average.
79. The Supreme Court Act requires that three of the nine justices of the Supreme Court
of Canada come from Quebec. This ensures that the Supreme Court is composed of a
minimum of civil law trained judges. The Chief Justice can thus use these three judges to
compose panels of five judges where they form a civilist majority. See Supreme Court Act,
RSC 1985, c S-26, s 6.
80. Following the examples of Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 52 and Benjamin Alarie &
Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hal LJ 1 and others, we report P-values for statistical tests
based on the assumption that every studied case is independent and drawn randomly from
a large population of all possible cases. This assumption of independence might not always
be satisfied. For instance, larger panels in cases from Ontario could theoretically be linked
to smaller panels in Quebec due to the judges’ limited time. Therefore P-values should be
interpreted with caution. We report them anyway, as they are a useful interpretation tool.
Unless specified otherwise, the P-values reported are for two-sided T-test for difference of
means, assuming equal variance.
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TABLE 1: AVERAGE PANEL SIZE FOR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
CASES, 1969-2013

Cartwirght Court (1969a-1970)

Only Federal Law

Fauteux Court (1970-1973)
Laskin Court (1973-1984)
Dickson Court (1984-1990)
Lamer Court (1990-2000)
McLachlin Court (2000-2013a)
All Courts (1969-2013)
Cartwright Court (1969a-1970)

All Areas of Law

Fauteux Court (1970-1973)
Laskin Court (1973-1984)
Dickson Court (1984-1990)
Lamer Court (1990-2000)
McLachlin Court (2000-2013a)
All Courts (1969-2013)

Cases from
Rest of Canada

Cases from
Quebec

Mean panel
size (N)

Mean panel
size (N)

6.91

5.00

(45)

(5)

6.98

6.83

(95)

(12)

7.64

7.44

(509)

(110)

6.92

6.58

(426)

(76)

7.36

6.75

(693)

(100)

7.90

7.77

(567)

(128)

7.45

7.18

(2335)

(431)

5.85

5.16

(146)

(25)

5.87

5.42

(302)

(77)

7.03

6.34

(967)

(300)

6.81

6.32

(611)

(133)

7.25

6.58

(972)

(168)

7.88

7.58

(883)

(222)

7.11

6.57

(3881)

(925)

a. Studied cases range from 1 January 1969 to 27 July 2013
b. Two sided T-test for difference of means, assuming equal variance

Diff. of
meansb
P value
0,111
0,773
0,198
0,039
0,001
0,278
0,001
0,012
0,005
< 0,001
< 0,001
< 0,001
0,004
< 0,001
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The logical next step was to inquire into whether language proficiency has an
impact on who sits on those cases and whether it is a plausible explanatory factor
for the difference in average panel-size. We looked at the panel composition to
see if unilingual judges were more likely to be left aside in federal law cases from
Quebec. To do so, we looked at the probability of a judge not to sit on a given
case. The results are reproduced in Table 2 below. The results show that language
is correlated with the likelihood to be exempted from federal law cases from
Quebec. For example, unilingual and unknown judges had a probability of 30
per cent of being exempted from federal law cases coming from Quebec while
bilingual judges had a probability of 17 per cent and Quebec judges a probability
of only 11 per cent of being exempted from such cases. Interestingly, these results
suggest that Quebec judges were as likely to be exempted from civil law cases
from Quebec as they were to be exempted from federal law cases coming from
Quebec. Meanwhile, RoC bilingual judges were still much more likely to sit on
civil law cases than their unilingual colleagues even if they might not have any
training in this area. Thus, legal specialization in civil or common law is perhaps
overemphasized when it comes to describing the actual work of the Court.
Regional and linguistic elements play, in all likelihood, a significant role when it
comes to assigning judges to cases argued in French.

All Areas of Law

Only Federal Law

TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF BEING “EXEMPTED” FROM A CASE, PER LINGUISTIC
GROUP, FOR CASES FROM THE ROC AND QUEBEC
Justice’s linguistic
group

Cases from RoC

Cases from Quebec

Diff. of pct P value

Unilingual

25%

30%

< 0,001

Unknown

24%

27%

0,331

RoC Bilingual

21%

17%

< 0,001

Quebec

25%

11%

< 0,001

Unilingual

18%

39%

< 0,001

Unknown

21%

50%

< 0,001

RoC Bilingual

15%

20%

< 0,001

Quebec

27%

11%

< 0,001
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This suggests that the level of fluency in French might be an important
factor influencing both the size and the composition of the panel in cases coming
from Quebec, regardless of whether they are federal law cases or provincial law
cases. This sheds new light on the grievance expressed by some critics of judicial
unilingualism who argue that francophone litigants cannot have a fair hearing at
the Supreme Court of Canada because some judges cannot understand their oral
argument.81 While this can be true when the Court hears a francophone case with
a full panel of nine judges, this situation may be less frequent than is generally
expected because francophone cases are heard on average by smaller panels and
unilingual judges are most likely to be the ones left aside in those cases. When the
Court is composed of seven or eight bilingual judges, francophone litigants can
be heard most of the time by a panel of five or seven bilingual judges, a pattern
compatible with our data. On the other hand, if anglophone judges are left
aside in cases in their area of expertise because they are argued in French, the
francophone litigants might “lose” these judges’ otherwise valuable voice simply
because their case is argued in French.
B. ASSERTIVENESS

The second dimension that we investigated is the level of assertiveness of
unilingual judges in cases coming from Quebec. Assertiveness can be defined as
the fact of making one’s voice heard. We thus measured it as the probability that
a judge will write an opinion every time he or she hears a case. Judges who write
opinions more often are considered more assertive. Assertiveness is somewhat
linked to collegiality82 (judges who are more collegial are often less assertive, they
tend to “go with the flow”) but it captures a different dimension of a judge’s
behaviour.83 A low level of assertiveness, measured as a low probability of writing
an opinion, indicates that a judge often prefers to endorse the opinion of one
of his or her colleagues, be it in a majority, a concurrence, or a dissent, rather
81. See e.g. Doucet, Justice and Human Rights Committee, supra note 64.
82. On collegiality generally and its impact on judicial behaviour in the Canadian context, see
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology,
Collegiality, and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 58 UNBLJ 73 and
Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 65 at ch 8.
83. Here is an example of a situation where assertiveness and collegiality are not linked. In a case
coming from Quebec, a decision could have one majority opinion and two dissents, all three
opinions being authored by a Quebec judge. If bilingual judges join one of the dissents,
this would normally be seen as not being collegial because they do not follow the majority.
However, they cannot be described as being assertive because they do not write an opinion,
they simply decide to follow another colleague who is not in the majority.

Rubin, Rubin, Unilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada 741

than expressing his or her own views. Therefore, with regards to the level of
assertiveness of unilingual judges, we made the following hypothesis:
H2: Unilingual judges are less assertive in cases where they cannot understand the oral
arguments or the briefs submitted and are thus more likely to join their fellow bilingual
colleagues either in the majority, in a concurrence, or a dissent in francophone cases.

To measure the level of assertiveness, we looked at the probability that a
judge writes an opinion when sitting in a federal law case coming from Quebec
or the RoC. Assertiveness is thus not correlated to panel size; it simply measures
the probability that, when a judge hears a case, he or she writes an opinion in
that particular case. Since it is difficult to sort out which judge was more active
in the drafting process when an opinion was co-authored, we looked at both solo
opinions (i.e., the opinion of the majority, a concurrence, or a dissent that was
signed by only one author) and joint opinions despite that the differences are small.
Figure 1 below shows the probability, for each judge, of writing a solo
opinion when hearing a federal law case from Quebec and from the rest of
Canada between 1969 and 2013. For example, in federal law cases coming from
Quebec that Justice Fauteux heard from 1969 onward, he wrote a solo opinion
81 per cent of the time. Similarly, Chief Justice Wagner wrote a solo opinion in
50 per cent of federal law cases coming from Quebec that he heard in his first
year. At the other extreme, Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Rothstein, Judson,
and Abbott never wrote a solo opinion in a federal law case coming from Quebec.
On average, a judge had a probability of 19 per cent of writing a solo opinion
when he or she sat on a federal law case coming from Quebec. Interestingly, all
unilingual judges had a probability of writing a solo opinion that is lower than
the average judge on the Court.
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FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF WRITING A SOLO OPINION, PER JUSTICE, FOR
FEDERAL LAW CASES HEARD FROM QUEBEC AND THE ROC, 1969-2013

: Heard less than 150 federal law cases from 1969 to 2013.

†

The picture becomes even clearer when judges are aggregated by linguistic
group. Table 3 below reproduces the data shown in Figure 1 by individual judges
(and adds joint opinions) once aggregated by linguistic group. Table 3 outlines
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the probability that a judge from a given linguistic group will write a solo or a
joint opinion in a federal law case coming either from Quebec or the RoC. When
grouped together, it becomes manifest that unilingual judges are significantly less
likely to write an opinion in a federal law case if it originates from Quebec. For
example, a unilingual judge has a 12 per cent chance of writing a solo opinion
when he or she hears a case coming from Quebec, while a bilingual judge has
15 per cent chance, and a Quebec judge has 29 per cent chance. On the other
hand, a unilingual judge has a 26 per cent chance of writing a solo opinion in a
federal law case coming from the RoC as compared to 20 per cent for a bilingual
judge and 18 per cent for a Quebec judge. This suggests that there is a correlation
between the level of proficiency in French and the probability of writing an
opinion in a federal law case from Quebec.
TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF WRITING AN OPINION PER LINGUISTIC GROUP WHEN
HEARING A FEDERAL LAW CASE, 1969-2013
Justice’s
linguistic
group

Solo opinion

Solo or joint opinion

RoC case

Quebec case

RoC case

Quebec case

Diff. of pcta
P value

Unilingual

26%

12%

27%

14%

< 0,001

Unknown

20%

10%

20%

11%

< 0,001

RoC
Bilingual

20%

15%

23%

17%

< 0,001

Quebec

18%

29%

19%

31%

< 0,001

a. Two sided T-test for difference of percentage in solo opinion. Using solo or joint opinion
yields similar results.

Interestingly, these numbers also suggest that bilingual and Quebec judges
are less likely to write opinions in cases coming from the rest of Canada than their
unilingual colleagues. There are two complementary possible explanations for
these findings. The first explanation is that judges might either volunteer for or be
assigned by the Chief Justice to write an opinion in cases in which they can speak
the language used by the parties. This linguistic separation of labour is normally
not captured by other accounts of the internal workings of the Court.84 The
84. Emmett MacFarlane, for example, in his analysis of the work of the Supreme Court of
Canada, never touches on the question of language. See Emmett MacFarlane, Governing from
the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
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second and related explanation is what might be termed “assertiveness aversion.”85
Since bilingual judges (and even more so Quebec judges) must devote more time
to francophone federal law opinions, they have less time overall to devote to other
decisions, therefore reducing their level of assertiveness in RoC cases. Because
of their increased caseload in francophone federal law cases, bilingual judges
might have the tendency not to voice their opinion when it comes to anglophone
federal law cases because this would increase their overall caseload and they thus
prefer to go along with their colleagues. In other words, increased caseload for
one linguistic group on the bench could have the indirect effect of silencing the
judges of this group in other cases.
C. CASELOAD

The third dimension that we examined is the linguistic distribution of the federal
law caseload of each judge. By looking at this, we wanted to assess the claim that
Quebec and bilingual judges write more opinions for Quebec federal law cases
than their unilingual colleagues. We made this hypothesis:
H3: Because they have a low proficiency in French, the proportion of the opinions
of unilingual judges for federal law cases coming from Quebec as compared to those
coming from the RoC (i.e., their federal law caseload) will be lower than their bilingual
colleagues.

Before we move forward, it is important to note that this dimension is
correlated with our two previous findings, namely that unilingual judges hear
fewer federal law cases coming from Quebec than their bilingual and Quebec
colleagues and, even when they hear them, they have a lower probability of
writing an opinion in the case. Given that unilingual judges hear fewer federal
law cases and write less often in those cases, their overall federal law caseload will
be, ceteris paribus, composed of fewer of those cases than their bilingual and
Quebec colleagues. This gives a picture of the linguistic distribution of the federal
law caseload of each individual judge.
As shown in Figure 2, Supreme Court of Canada judges wrote on average 14
per cent of their federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec and 86 per
cent in cases coming from the rest of Canada. Interestingly, bilingual judges write
a significantly higher proportion of their federal law opinions for cases coming
from Quebec than their unilingual colleagues.
85. Epstein, Landes & Posner repeatedly use the concept of “dissent aversion.” We borrow the
concept from them but use it in a slightly broader way to capture assertiveness in general and
not only dissents. See especially Lee Epstein, William Landes & Richard Posner, The Behavior
of Federal Judges (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013) ch 6.
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This suggests that language might play a role similar to legal specialization
in the composition of the caseload of each judge. Donald Songer has shown
that judges tend to specialize in one or two areas of law that represent a larger
share of their caseload.86 It seems that language plays out in the same way and
might be another kind of specialization that superimposes itself over other legal
specialization. Some judges thus become “French experts” as others are criminal
law experts or corporate law experts.

86. Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical
Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 131-32.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICES, PER OPINION AUTHORED
OR CO-AUTHORED, FOR FEDERAL LAW CASES FROM QUEBEC AND
THE ROC, 1969-2013

†

: Heard less than 150 federal law cases from 1969 to 2013.

One must remember that the proportions shown in Figure 2 are for federal
law cases, i.e., cases for which judges are presumed to be equally competent (even
though their degree of specialization may indeed vary). However, irrespective of
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their degree of specialization in federal law, the caseload coming from Quebec
is distributed unevenly between unilingual and bilingual judges partly along
linguistic lines. For example, Justice Rothstein, a federal law expert who served
for 14 years on the Martial Court, the Federal Court, and the Federal Court of
Appeal before being appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, wrote only
one opinion in a federal law case coming from Quebec: A short seven paragraph
dissent co-authored with the bilingual Chief Justice McLachlin.87 Similarly,
Justice William McIntyre, who was considered to be a criminal law expert, wrote
only 10 per cent of his federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec. The
problem with this kind of linguistic specialization is that it might silence the
valuable voice of unilingual experts that cannot address important issues in their
field simply because they were raised in a case where they could not understand
the language of the parties.
If we assume that all cases are equally complex and equally labour-consuming,
this suggests that bilingual and Quebec judges devote more time to Quebec
federal law cases than their unilingual colleagues. As we will discuss in the next
section, this might be problematic in that it can reinforce the “two solitudes”
on the bench. When judges are grouped in their linguistic categories as presented
in Table 4, the results show clearly the difference between unilingual, unknown,
bilingual, and Quebec judges in terms of the proportion of all the opinions they
write for federal law cases (i.e., the number of opinions they write either as author
or coauthor in the majority judgement, a concurrence or a dissent).
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL LAW CASELOAD,
PER LINGUISTIC GROUP, 1969-2013

Justice’s linguistic group

Proportion of opinions written
(majority, concurrence and dissent)
Cases from Qc

Cases from RoC

Unilingual

7%

93%

Unknown

8%

92%

RoC Bilingual

12%

88%

Quebec

25%

75%

Uni. vs Bilingual P value

< 0,001

< 0,001

87. R v Ouellete, 2009 SCC 24.
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D. DEFERENCE

The last dimension that we examined is the impact of language on the level
of deference towards appellate courts. We measure the level of deference as
the likelihood of a judge overturning the lower court’s decision. Scholars have
often noted that common law judges might be more deferential towards civil
law appellate courts than towards common law ones.88 While this hypothesis is
highly plausible, especially in private law cases, it is also possible that unilingual
judges are more deferential towards francophone appellate courts even if the
ruling is in an area of federal law. With regard to the level of deference, we thus
made the following hypothesis:
H4: Unilingual judges will be more deferential towards the Court of Appeal when they
cannot fully understand the case coming before them and will therefore tend to have a
lower overturn rate in these cases compared to other judges.

After inspection, this hypothesis is not supported by the data. If our
hypothesis were right then unilingual judges would have a lower overturn rate
in federal law cases from Quebec than their bilingual and Quebec colleagues.
However, when we inspect unilingual, bilingual, unknown, and Quebec judges’
overturn rates, the linguistic groups do not behave differently. There seems to be
no significant difference in their level of deference for federal law cases coming
from Quebec and from the RoC. Table 5 presents the proportion of cases where
each linguistic category of judges voted to overturn the Quebec Court of Appeal’s
decision as compared to cases coming from other appellate courts from the
RoC. Interestingly, there is almost no statistically significant difference between
linguistic groups in their overturn rate.

88. See e.g. Snell & Vaughan, supra note 15 at 228-229. The authors comment on the decision
Lachine v Industrial Glass Co Ltd, [1978] 1 SCR 988, in which Justices Pigeon and Pratte
dissented while Justices Laskin, Judson, and Spence formed the majority, upholding the
decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal. Snell and Vaughan do not touch on the question of
the impact of language proficiency on the behaviour of the three anglophone judges (Justices
Laskin and Spence are classified in our “unknown” category). By focusing only on federal
law cases, we tried to tease out the impact of language from the impact of the different
legal traditions.
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TABLE 5: LEVEL OF DEFERENCE OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES PER LINGUISTIC
CATEGORY FOR FEDERAL LAW CASES COMING FROM QUEBEC AND FROM
THE ROC, 1969-2013
Judges’ linguistic
group

Votes to overturn

Diff. of pct
P value

Lower court
from the RoC

Lower court
from Quebec

Unilingual

42%

52%

< 0,001

Unknown

41%

46%

0,128

RoC Bilingual

44%

51%

< 0,001

Quebec

42%

51%

< 0,001

These results should be interpreted with caution to ensure that one does
not infer from them more than is actually warranted. Let us start with what
the results tell.
The results do show that individual judges at the Court disagree more often
with the Quebec Court of Appeal than they do with other appellate courts,
regardless of their proficiency in French. These findings for the behaviour of
individual judges are not very surprising given that previous studies have already
shown that decisions of the Quebec Court of Appeal are overturned more often
by the Supreme Court of Canada than most other appellate courts in Canada.89
Our results tell us also that this does not seem to be influenced by the linguistic
capacities of the individual judges.
However, the results do not show whether Quebec, bilingual, and unilingual
judges vote in the same way. Imagine a court constantly split 5-4 where unilingual
and bilingual judges are systematically on opposing sides. Even if they all vote 50
per cent of the time to overturn the Court of Appeal, the results in the aggregate
would not tell us much about this pattern despite the fact that bilingual and
unilingual judges would vote completely differently. Thus, the results do not
tell us whether Quebec, bilingual, and unilingual judges vote differently. They
simply tell us that, overall, Supreme Court of Canada judges vote as frequently to
overturn the decisions of appellate courts regardless of their linguistic proficiency.
Also, the results do not tell us whether unilingual judges follow the leadership of
89. Michael H Lubetsky & Joshua A Krane, “Appealing Outcomes: A Study of the Overturn
Rate of Canada’s Appellate Courts” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 131.
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their bilingual or Quebec colleagues by voting with them. Finally, the results do
not tell us whether unilingual judges vote differently in Quebec cases than they
do in cases from the RoC. We think that future research should try to assess the
impact of linguistic proficiency on those dimensions of judicial behaviour.

IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Since this study is the first that seeks to assess empirically the impact of
unilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada, the results are provisory and
exploratory in nature. There are still many blind spots and the results here do not
prove that there is a causal link between unilingualism and judicial behaviour but
simply a statistically significant correlation between these two variables. Further
studies should try to control for other confounding variables such as temporal
factors, the province of origin of the judge, the complexity of the case, the area
of law at issue, or the appointing party. Moreover, other ways of categorizing the
level of fluency in both official languages (e.g., native speaker, second language,
unilingual, etc.) might lead to slightly different results. Despite this, our results
suggest four different conclusions.
First, language proficiency of individual judges might affect the size and
the composition of panels at the Supreme Court of Canada. This is based on
our finding that the panel size for federal law cases was statistically significantly
lower for federal law cases coming from Quebec than for those coming from
the RoC. Moreover, since unilingual judges were more likely to be “exempted”
from federal law cases coming from Quebec than their Quebec and bilingual
colleagues, this suggests that language might influence both the size and the
composition of panels.
Second, our findings suggest that linguistic proficiency might have an
impact on the level of assertiveness of judges. This conclusion is based on our
finding that unilingual judges have a lower probability of writing a solo or a
joint opinion when they hear a federal law case coming from Quebec than their
bilingual colleagues, a relationship that is the opposite when the Court hears a
federal law case coming from the RoC.
Third, our findings suggest that linguistic proficiency might influence the
individual distribution of federal law caseload. This conclusion, in line with the
two previous findings, is based on the fact that Quebec and bilingual judges write
a higher proportion of their federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec
than their unilingual colleagues.
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Fourth, our findings suggest that, all other things being equal, linguistic
proficiency does not seem to affect the level of deference towards appellate courts.
This conclusion is based on our findings that unilingual, bilingual, and Quebec
judges have a similar overturn rate for federal law cases coming from Quebec.
Further research should try to see whether this is true across all areas of law or
whether judges are more prone to be deferential in certain kinds of cases, such as
linguistic rights or federalism cases.
These findings are important for three main reasons. First, in federal law
cases coming from Quebec, bilingual judges might have more influence than
unilingual judges. Since the panel size is on average smaller, a lack of bilingualism
might be detrimental to unilingual judges because they cannot make their voices
heard in a significant proportion of cases of importance for the whole country.
However, we have not taken into consideration the level of complexity and the
importance of the cases.90 It is possible that unilingual judges are more assertive in
more complex and important issues. Future research should explore this question.
The second reason is that this linguistic separation of labour might perpetuate
“two solitudes” at the Court.91 Because Quebec and bilingual judges sit, write,
and devote more of their time to francophone cases than their unilingual
colleagues do, francophone judges are more likely to write for a francophone
audience, using francophone citations while anglophone judges are more likely
to write for an anglophone audience using anglophone citations. When one takes
into consideration the additional fact that media coverage of the Court is very
different in francophone and anglophone media,92 this is hardly fertile ground for
any kind of cross-breeding of the two legal solitudes of Canadian law.
The third reason is directly related to the form of normative debates we
have discussed in Part I. Since language proficiency seems to affect panel size
90. On “complexity” and the distribution of opinion-writing, see Peter McCormick, “Judgment
and Opportunity: Decision Assignment on the McLachlin Court” (2015) 38 Dal LJ 271.
91. On this issue, see Roderick A MacDonald, “Legal Bilingualism” (1997) 42 McGill LJ
119. See also Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Les solitudes du bijuridisme au Canada
(Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2005). Interestingly, Peter McCormick pointed out that the
decisions of the Court of Appeal of Quebec represented only 3 per cent of cross-citations
among Canadian Courts of Appeal while the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario
represented 40 per cent of all such citations. Given the size of the province and the caseload
of its Court of Appeal, this is hardly explainable only in terms of the civil/common law
distinction. See Peter McCormick, “Judicial Authority and the Provincial Courts of Appeal:
A Statistical Investigation of Citation Practices” (1993-1994) 22 Man LJ 286 at 297.
92. On the difference between French and English media coverage of the Supreme Court of
Canada, see Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 49-56.
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and opinion writing, bilingualism looks like a legal characteristic. By this we mean
that language, like other legal skills, seems to play a role in explaining who sits
on which cases, who voices his or her opinion, and on which cases judges devote
most of their time. Thus, at least when it comes to describing the actual working
of the Court and the behaviour of its judges, linguistic proficiency is like another
legal characteristic. In other words, it is as if language proficiency superimposes
itself as an additional layer of specialization in addition to traditional subject
matter legal specialization. As for the impact of bilingualism as an “identity”
requirement discussed in Part I, future research should try to assess whether
unilingual, bilingual, and Quebec judges vote differently. At least when it comes
to deference to francophone appellate courts, it seems that linguistic identity does
not play a critical role—i.e., Quebec and bilingual judges do not seem to have
any stronger “affiliation” to the Quebec Court of Appeal than their unilingual
colleagues. Admittedly, our results are only provisory and future research should
try to assess whether the “identity” dimension of linguistic proficiency influences
other aspects of judicial behaviour.
As we pointed out in the introduction, the empirical literature on the
impact of multilingualism in judicial institutions is almost non-existent both in
Canada and in other jurisdictions. Here are five paths that are worth exploring
in future studies:
1. Does unilingualism influence the level of penetration of legal ideas
coming from the other linguistic legal culture?93 In other words,
do judges tend to cite less treatises, journal articles, or appellate
courts’ decisions when they are not or less fluent in this language?
2. What is the impact of francophone interveners as compared to
anglophone interveners? Some studies suggest that interveners at
the Supreme Court of Canada have a moderating effect on judicial
behaviour.94 Is the relative impact of such interveners greater for
anglophone submissions as compared to francophone submissions?
Are anglophone interveners more successful at influencing the vote
of unilingual judges than francophone interveners?

93. Peter McCormick has studied the level of citations of journal articles cited by the Supreme
Court of Canada. Even though his findings are interesting from an aggregate perspective,
he does not break down citations for individual justices nor does he calculate the number of
francophone and anglophone citations. McCormick, “Judges and Journals,” supra note 58.
94. Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew J Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada:
Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 381.
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3. What is the impact of law clerks in easing lower levels of fluency
in the other official language? In other words, do we see a different
pattern of decision-making when judges have more bilingual law
clerks? What is the optimal number of bilingual law clerks above
which adding one more bilingual clerk does not make any difference
in the outcome? Has the overall level of bilingualism of the Court
increased over time?
4. What is the impact of lower levels of assertiveness on actual
outcomes? If unilingual judges are less assertive in francophone
cases, they will be more likely to cast a vote that differs from
their preferred outcome. It would be interesting to measure the
difference between their average liberal voting score for federal law
cases coming before them in English as compared to those coming
before them in French and to see if there is a difference. Do these
differences reflect the leadership of their Quebec or bilingual
colleagues? Does the linguistic composition of the Court influence
its median voter?
5. What is the impact of language proficiency in other multilingual
jurisdictions? Do the patterns identified here are the same in other
institutional contexts and what mechanisms can alleviate the
differences between unilingual and multilingual judges?
On a final note, we hope that this positive discussion will make future
normative debates about the requirement of mandatory bilingualism at the
Supreme Court of Canada more empirically informed.
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V. APPENDIX A
Judges

Category

Reason

Cartwright

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Writer’s assessment

Fauteux

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual teaching experience (McGill and Ottawa)

Abbott

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (McGill and Dijon) and
presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)

Martland

Unknown

Not enough information

Judson

Bilingual

Writer’s assessment

Ritchie

Unknown

Not enough information

Hall

Bilingual

English and French education (Sask) and French
work experience (SCC site, taught French)

Spence

Unknown

Not enough information

Pigeon

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Writer’s assessment

Laskin

Unknown

Media coverage

Dickson

Unilingual

Biographer’s assessment

Beetz

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (UdeM and Oxford)

de Grandpré

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (McGill and Collège St-Marie)

Estey

Unilingual

Media coverage

Pratte

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (Laval and UToronto)

McIntyre

Unilingual

Biographer’s assessment

Chouinard

Bilingual

Bilingual Education (Laval and Oxford)

Lamer

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)

Wilson

Unilingual

Biographer’s assessment

Le Dain

Bilingual

Bilingual education and teaching experience

La Forest

Bilingual

Media coverage and biographer’s assessment

L’Heureux-Dubé

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)

Sopinka

Unilingual

Media coverage
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Gonthier

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (Collège Stanislas and McGill)

Cory

Bilingual

Writer’s assessment

McLachlin

Bilingual

Writer’s assessment

Stevenson

Unilingual

Writer’s assessment

Iacobucci

Bilingual

Media coverage

Major

Unilingual

Writer’s assessment and media coverage

Bastarache

Bilingual

Bilingual Education and Teaching (UdeM and
UOttawa)

Binnie

Bilingual

Media coverage

Arbour

Bilingual

Bilingual education and teaching experience (UdeM
education and Osgoode Hall teaching)

LeBel

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (ULaval and UToronto)

Deschamps

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (UdeM and McGill)

Fish

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Bilingual Education (Mcgill and Paris)

Abella

Bilingual

Media coverage

Charron

Bilingual

Bilingual education and teaching experience
(Carleton Education, Ottawa French teaching)

Rothstein

Unilingual

Media coverage and personal testimony during the
hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee to Review a
Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada

Cromwell

Bilingual

Media coverage

Moldaver

Unilingual

Media coverage and personal testimony during
the hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices

Karakatsanis

Bilingual

Media coverage and personal testimony during
the hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices

Wagner

Bilingual
(From Qc)

Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)

